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9 
The European Union and other international[1] 
institutions 
For more than forty-four years, Britain has been a member of one of the world’s most powerful 
supranational trading and political alliances: the European Union (EU). But, in a seismic turn of 
events which was greeted with a mix of irritation and incomprehension by its twenty-seven fellow 
member states, on 23 June 2016 the country’s electorate voted by a 52 to 48 per cent margin to leave 
the Union, in a national referendum which is certain to have long-lasting repercussions for its 
standing in the world. 
The immediate background to (and fallout from) ‘Brexit’—shorthand for ‘British exit’—is 
examined in detail later in this chapter. For now, though, the UK remains a full participating member 
of the EU, at least until such time as it formally invokes Article 50 of the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon (see 
9.1). This clause in its membership contract will set the stopwatch ticking on the two-year period 
departing states are given to prepare for the exit doors. Moreover, with some senior politicians - 
notably Jeremy Corbyn’s unsuccessful challenger for the Labour leadership, Owen Smith[AM2][j3], and 
Liberal Democrat leader Tim Farron - arguing that a second referendum will be needed to sanction 
Britain’s final withdrawal, once negotiations on the terms of its future relationship with the EU are 
concluded, there remains the slim possibility that the country could still be a member for years to 
come. For the time being, then, the obligations and opportunities arising from EU membership 
continue to have a direct impact on the day-to-day lives and well-being of British citizens—making a 
knowledge of the Union, and its component institutions, as essential for journalists as ever. 
What, then, does EU membership mean for Britain, and how did it originally come about? 
9.1 Britain’s twisty path to EU membership 
The European ‘Common Market’ (as it was widely known in Britain until the 1970s) began slowly 
emerging in the post-war period, as the continent struggled to rebuild itself. But although it shared 
many of the same economic interests as its neighbours, for a long time Britain’s attitude towards 
them was lukewarm. Buffered by the existence of its Commonwealth of dependent nations, on the 
one hand (see 9.8.6) and its nascent ‘special relationship’ with the United States on the other, it was 
reluctant to be too tied to the activities of its Continental cousins. 
By 1961, however, the positive economic impact membership of the then European Economic 
Community (EEC) appeared to be having for its member states encouraged the UK, under 
Conservative Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, to apply for membership alongside Denmark, 
Ireland, and Norway. At the time, its application was blocked by France’s, President Charles de 
Gaulle, who twice obstructed it (in 1963 and 1967), but following his resignation in 1969, 
negotiations began in earnest for Britain’s accession. It was duly admitted under Edward Heath’s 
Conservative government in 1973. Ireland and Denmark joined at the same time. 
Yet any hopes that the UK’s entry would put an end to its years of squabbling with its European 
neighbours—not to mention infighting over the European Community (EC) within the UK’s main 
political parties—were short-lived. By the time Heath was succeeded by Labour’s Harold Wilson, in 
1974, divisions were so marked that the stage was set for Britain’s first referendum on the subject. In 
a then unprecedented move that would be replicated four decades later by Tory premier David 
Cameron, Wilson waived the decades-old convention of collective responsibility (see 3.2.2) to let 
members of his government opposed to his pro-EC stance actively campaign against the country’s 
continued membership. His opponents at the Cabinet table included then Industry Secretary Tony 
Benn and Employment Secretary Michael Foot, who argued that free trade between Britain and its 
Continental neighbours was allowing cheap imports to flood high-street shops, undermining the 
profits of British-based manufacturers and leading to job cuts. 
Despite the efforts of the ‘no’ lobby, Wilson got his way decisively enough to lay to rest the EC 
membership debate for a generation: his ‘Yes’ campaign clinched more than two-thirds of votes in 
the referendum, on a 64 per cent turnout. His triumph was, however, pyrrhic: Britain’s admission 
into the EU marked the beginning of what would continue to be a troubled and deeply conflicted 
relationship with the Union. At various points during its membership, the country has refused to toe 
the line—negotiating ‘opt-outs’ from clauses to treaties that bind most, if not all, of its peers (for 
example John Major’s refusal to sign the Social Chapter of the ‘Maastricht Treaty’ and David 
Cameron’s rejection of the Fiscal Compact approved by all other member states save the Czech 
Republic in December 2011) and struggling to win parliamentary approval for various others. In 
1992, Mr Major’s government was almost felled by its own backbenchers over ‘Maastricht’—an 
episode explored in depth later in this chapter—while Tony Blair and Gordon Brown both resisted 
the clamour for a referendum on the ‘Lisbon Treaty’, a similarly controversial agreement that many 
‘Eurosceptics’ (and some ‘Europhiles’, such as Tory Kenneth Clarke) argued was essentially the 
same document as the ill-fated ‘EU Constitution’ (see 9.5). Hardly surprising, perhaps, that, despite 
vowing more than a decade earlier to stop his party ‘banging on about Europe’, by the time of the 
2015 general election Mr Cameron was leader of a party still so riven with splits over the EU that he 
was forced to promise a decisive ‘in-out referendum’ in the event of being returned to government. 
Aside from Sweden and Denmark, Britain is the only EU state to have held out against joining the 
euro (see 9.4.2), while its refusal to sign the Schengen Agreement (see Table 9.1) is the reason why 
Britons are still expected to show their national passports when crossing internal EU borders—and 
citizens of other member states to do likewise when entering the UK—while freedom of movement 
brings with it no such obligations elsewhere. 
9.2 Evolution of the European Union (EU) 
So how did today’s EU come about? And how was it transformed from a loose confederation of 
states cooperating over trade in core post-war raw materials (principally steel and coal) into a 
sprawling supranational alliance exercising a degree of control—often contentiously—over 
everything from employment rights to economic migration? 
Table 9.1 Chronology of main EU treaties 
Agreement Year signed Main provisions 
Treaty of Paris 1951 Established European Coal 
and Steel Community 
(ECSC), to initiate joint 
production of two materials 
most central to war effort 
(coal and steel) and fledgling 
European assembly, which 
met for first time in 
Strasbourg in September 
1952. 
Treaties of Rome 1957 These twin treaties spawned 
two organizations later to 
coalesce: European 
Economic Community (EEC) 
and European Atomic Energy 
Community (EURATOM). 
Joint aim was to foster trade 
between member states by 
ending tariffs and other 
distortions in market and: 
1. introducing Common 
Agricultural Policy 
(CAP)—encouraging 
free trade in 
agricultural products, 
while guaranteeing 
farmers’ incomes in 
relation to 
competition from 
third-party countries 
through subsidies; and
2. creating ‘common 
market’ for free 
movement of goods, 
services, and capital 
between member 
states (in practice, 
only free trade in 
goods followed until 
Single European Act 
1986). 
Merger of three European 
Unions 
1965 Led to 1967 merger of ECSC, 
EURATOM, and EEC into 
single European Community 
(EC), framed around four 
core institutions: European 
Commission; European 
Assembly (later renamed 
European Parliament (EP)); 
European Court of Justice 
(ECJ); and future Council of 
Ministers. 
Launch of European 
Monetary System (EMS) 
1979 Relaxed exchange rates 
between member states 
leading to launch of euro. 
Enlargement 1981 Greece admitted into EC. 
Single European Act and 
further enlargement 
1986 First full-scale revision of 
original 1957 European 
Treaties, defining structure of 
new-look EC, and paving 
way for following extensions 
of community: 
1. greater economic 
integration; 
2. strengthened 
supranational 
institutions; and 
3. practical moves 
towards single 
European currency 
and linked exchange 
rates in form of 
economic and 
monetary union 
(EMU). In same year, 
Spain and Portugal 
entered EC. 
Treaty on the European 
Union (‘Maastricht Treaty’) 
1992 EC formally renamed 
‘European Union’ (EU), 
adding new areas of 
responsibility. Although 
signed in February 1992, had 
to be formally ratified by 
each state and passage was 
far from smooth in Britain. It: 
1. introduced EU-wide 
commitment to move 
towards full EMU—
and eventual single 
currency or ‘common’ 
one (native currencies 
retained, in parallel 
with EU one); 
2. established single 
European Union from 
existing communities; 
3. set up framework for 
potential common 
foreign and security 
policy; 
4. increased cooperation 
on domestic issues, 
particularly criminal 
justice; 
5. established principle 
of subsidiarity—
system defining EU 
institutions as 
‘subsidiary to’ those 
of individual member 
states and 
safeguarding their 
ability to run own 
internal affairs 
without consulting 
EU unless unable to 
achieve national 
objectives 
unilaterally; and 
6. introduced concept of 
‘EU citizenship’. 
Corfu Treaty 1994 Allowed Austria, Finland, 
and Sweden to join EU in 
January 1995, and paved way 
for Norway’s accession 
(though it has never joined). 
Amsterdam Treaty 1997 Arose out of 1996 
Intergovernmental 
Conference (IGC) convened 
by heads of EU states. 
Extended rights of EU 
citizens in relation to: 
1. consumer protection; 
2. fight against crime 
and drugs; and 
3. environmental 
protection. 
Treaty also introduced 
Charter on Fundamental 
Workers’ Rights. 
Britain, Ireland, and 
Denmark opted out of 
common EU 
immigration/asylum policy, 
leaving rest to form 
Schengen Group, which UK 
declined to join in 2000. Its 
name referred to the 
Schengen Agreement—
signed in two stages, in 1985 
and 1990—abolishing border 
controls between 
participating nations. 
Helsinki Summit 1999 Removed existing system 
under which notional target 
dates set for accession of 
specific countries to EU 
membership. From now on, 
any country meeting 
conditions would be eligible 
for swift entry.  
Agenda 2000, For a Stronger 
and Wider Europe 
2000 Document proposing 
blueprint for onward 
development of Community 
in twenty-first century. Many 
provisions intended to 
prevent future disagreements 
between members like those 
provoked by discussion of 
EMU, proposed common 
defence policy, and CAP. 
Also signalled attempt to set 
firm rules for acceptance of 
new countries. Among its 
stipulations were: 
1. any new country 
wishing to join EU 
must meet economic 
and political criteria 
for membership and 
adopt acquis 
communitaire—laws 
and policies of EU—
before being 
accepted; 
2. redefining CAP and 
‘structural funds’ used 
to ensure equitable 
socio-economic 
infrastructure across 
Europe; 
3. expressing then 
Commission’s view 
on proposed accession 
to EU of 
central/eastern 
European states; and 
4. proposing new 
budgetary framework 
for EU, with initial 
proposals for 
Community-wide 
budget ‘not exceeding 
1.27% of EU’s GNP’. 
Nice Treaty 2000 ‘Proclaimed’ EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights 
(conflation of principles 
outlined in preceding 
European Convention on 
Human Rights—see 1.1.1.1). 
Charter’s 53 ‘Articles’ not 
legally binding, but expressed 
shared set of aims, including: 
1. equality between men 
and women; 
2. fair and just working 
conditions; 
3. workers’ rights to 
collective bargaining 
and industrial action; 
4. public rights to access 
EU documents; and 
5. right of elderly to life 
of ‘dignity’. 
Consensus emerged that 
EU’s main governing 
institutions would have to 
change over time for 
following reasons: 
1. arrival of twelve 
potential new 
members meant they 
needed votes in 
Council of Ministers, 
own EU 
commissioners, seats 
in EP, and judges; 
2. reunification of 
Germany, following 
1990 fall of Berlin 
Wall; and 
3. impact of EU 
enlargement on 
asylum, immigration, 
and economic 
migration. 
Göteborg Summit 2001 Focused on perceived 
conflict between EU 
membership and Irish 
Constitution, particularly 
regarding province’s 
neutrality. Around same time, 
Ireland voted ‘No’ in 
referendum on EU 
membership. Another 
controversy stemmed from 
realization of larger member 
states that enlargement might 
result in reductions in funds 
they received from EU. 
  1.  
Enlargement of the Union 2004 Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Malta, and Greek Cyprus 
joined EU. 
Enlargement  2007 Romania and Bulgaria joined. 
European Union Reform 
Treaty (‘Treaty of Lisbon’) 
2007 Succeeded short-lived ‘EU 
Constitution’—abandoned 
after being rejected in French 
and Dutch referendums. 
‘Lisbon Treaty’ also rejected 
by Ireland (initially), but 
eventually came into force in 
December 2009. Main 
provisions were to: 
1. make Charter of 
Fundamental Rights 
legally binding; 
2. extend role of directly 
elected European 
Parliament; 
3. introduce permanent 
president of European 
Council to replace 
‘rotating presidency’ 
and formally 
recognize Council as 
fifth EU governing 
institution; and 
4. give EU legal status 
as single entity 
capable of signing 
international treaties 
with other institutions 
or bodies. 
Enlargement 2013 Croatia joined. 
The EU’s evolution can best be charted with reference to the treaties and summits that paved the 
way for it to become the hugely influential entity it is today. The most significant stages in the EU’s 
evolution are outlined in Table 9.1. 
Of all treaties listed, the British government found it most difficult to ratify ‘Maastricht’ (see 
later in this chapter). It was not alone: in its own 1992 national referendum, Danish citizens rejected 
it and their government only squeaked it through eleven months later, after negotiating ‘opt-outs’ 
from two of its key provisions: economic and monetary union (EMU) and then moves towards a 
common European defence policy. 
9.3 The main EU institutions 
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As with almost any subject, the most newsworthy EU stories have tended to arise out of conflict and 
division. Notwithstanding ongoing wrangles over the Union’s future direction and scope, many 
contentious issues have emerged from day-to-day deliberations of the EU’s five principal governing 
institutions: 
 European Commission (EC); 
 European Parliament (EP); 
 Council of the European Union (Council of Ministers); 
 Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU); and 
 European Council. 
Each institution is chaired by its own president, elected or appointed in a distinct way. 
9.3.1 The European Commission 
Formed in 1951 and based in Brussels, the European Commission is the EU’s civil service and 
executive rolled into one. It employs 25,000 staff working at various levels across more than thirty 
‘departments and services’, known as Directorates-General. 
Each Directorate-General is headed by one of twenty-eight commissioners (one from each 
member state, appointed for a five-year period). Meetings are chaired by one of their number, elected 
president by the European Parliament (on the recommendation of the European Council, or Summit). 
The president chairs meetings of the Commission much as a prime minister sitting in Cabinet. 
Although the Council of Ministers, composed of representatives from each member state’s 
government, takes most final decisions on major political developments and structural changes in the 
EU, the Commission is responsible for initiating policy. It does this in much the same way as 
national policy is originated through Cabinet government, with commissioners sitting around a table 
developing ideas for prospective legislation. 
What makes the Commission more controversial is that none of its members is elected; rather, all 
are ‘proposed’ (nominated) by the governments of their native countries. The fact that they are 
chosen by democratically elected politicians arguably gives them some degree of legitimacy, but 
they are not directly answerable to the European citizens whose lives their proposals affect. This 
perceived lack of accountability was famously described in a 1980s pamphlet as a ‘democratic 
deficit’ by Liberal Democrat MEP Bill Newton Dunn. 
The Commission issues its policy proposals in three broad guises: regulations, decisions, and 
directives. Both regulations and directives must be scrutinized by the European Parliament and 
Council of Ministers before they can be enacted, but this is where any similarity between them ends. 
Regulations are EU-wide laws similar to British primary legislation, which, once passed in Council, 
will automatically apply in all member states. Directives are broader ‘end results’ that must be 
achieved in each state, but it is left up to individual members to decide how to implement them. 
Decisions, meanwhile, are binding laws (akin to private Bills in the UK—see 2.4.1.1) used to impose 
conditions or confer rights on individuals or authorities in a particular state: e.g. forcing a 
government department to issue new guidelines to local authorities on road signage or recycling. 
Not that policies devised by the Commission are automatically a done deal: contrary to popular 
myths about ‘Brussels diktats’, elected MEPs have ample opportunity to scrutinize and even reject 
them, and the final say on new regulations rests with the Council of Ministers. Moreover, although it 
has far greater political clout than the British Civil Service—which is merely tasked with 
implementing government policy ‘on the ground’ once Parliament has approved it—the Commission 
also fulfils this basic administrative function. 
In addition, the European Parliament may dismiss the Commission in exceptional 
circumstances—although, curiously, it is prevented from removing individual commissioners and 
must instead sack all of them. This scenario has arisen more than once. In March 1999, the 
Commission, under then President Jacques Santer, resigned en masse following publication of a 
damning report into its alleged nepotism. Although it stopped short of suggesting that any 
commissioner was directly involved in corrupt practices, the 144-page report, by five independent 
‘wise persons’, singled out former French Prime Minister Edith Cresson for her ‘dysfunctional’ 
organization and favouritism in staff appointments. 
Although unelected, commissioners are invariably experienced politicians or public figures who 
have previously served in senior positions in their home countries. Until the EU’s membership 
expanded from fifteen to twenty-five states in 2004, the countries with the biggest populations—
Britain, Germany, France, and Italy—had two each, with smaller states having just one. Among 
those who served in this capacity were former Labour leader Neil Kinnock, who was Commissioner 
for Transport, and the late Sir Leon Brittan, an ex-Conservative Home Secretary. Former Northern 
Ireland Secretary Lord Mandelson became Britain’s first single Commissioner in 2004 (overseeing 
trade), but after being recalled to the British Cabinet in Mr Brown’s second reshuffle he was replaced 
by Baroness Ashton of Upholland four years into his term. Following implementation of the Lisbon 
Treaty in December 2009, the Commission was dissolved and reconstituted, and Lady Ashton was 
elevated to the newly created role of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
(and one of seven vice-presidential positions). Her swift promotion was interpreted by some in the 
media as a consolation prize for Britain in the wake of the EU’s ‘snub’ to former Prime Minister Mr 
Blair’s designs on the first permanent ‘EU presidency’. At time of writing, Mr Cameron’s appointee, 
Lord Hill, had recently quit as Baroness Ashton’s successor, in response to the outcome of the June 
2016 ‘Brexit’ referendum. Lord Hill, who had held the then newly created brief overseeing financial 
stability, financial services, and capital markets, was replaced by Sir Julian King, Britain’s former 
ambassador to France, in one of Mr Cameron’s final acts in office. While there may have been a 
sense of déjà vu about some aspects of Sir Julian’s new role—he was put in charge of organized 
crime and counter-terrorism (an echo of Baroness Ashton’s responsibilities)—a pointed ‘mission 
letter’ by EC president Jean-Claude Juncker emphasized that none of the powers of existing 
commissioners would be handed to the new incumbent. This means that overarching authority over 
security policy remains with the home affairs commissioner (currently Dimitris Avramopoulos), who 
continues to represent the Commission in the European Parliament and Council of Ministers. 
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Enduring controversy over the Commission’s composition, powers, and privileges has led to 
repeated attempts to reform it. Its mammoth expenses bill is often cited as a concern for EU 
taxpayers, and terms like ‘Brussels bureaucrats’ and ‘gravy train’ are staple clichés in Britain’s 
tabloids. Expenses were somewhat addressed in the 1999 report and subsequent reforms, and in 
proposals for several further changes in early drafts of the ‘Lisbon Treaty’. These were to have 
included a reduction in the number of commissioners, with only two-thirds of member states being 
represented at any one time from 2014 and seats distributed fairly on a rotating basis. However, 
Ireland’s initial rejection of Lisbon in its 2008 referendum prompted the European Council to take 
the executive decision to retain the existing ‘one member, one commissioner’ system for the 
foreseeable future, by way of a peace offering to it and other smaller nations. The European 
Council’s ability to do this was itself formalized by Lisbon, which gives it the right to alter the 
number of commissioners unilaterally at any time, subject to unanimous approval by its members. 
The Commission’s present composition is outlined in table 9A to be found on the Online 
Resource Centre that accompanies this book. 
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9.3.2 The European Parliament 
Although the European Parliament is the one directly elected EU institution, until recently it had 
considerably less influence on law-making than either Commission or Council of Ministers. 
Traditionally, it has tended to be consulted on decisions, rather than taking them itself, rather like a 
giant House of Commons select committee, rather than a legislative assembly per se. For this reason, 
it has often been caricatured as a supine talking shop. However, Maastricht gave it the ability to 
reject legislation it disliked, according it ‘joint’ legislative status with the Council of Ministers in 
certain areas, under a process known as ‘co-decision’. Briefly, this works as follows: the 
Commission will pass a proposal for a new regulation or directive to the Parliament, which then 
expresses its opinion at a ‘first reading’. If the Council approves of this opinion, the ‘law’ is passed; 
if not, it will deliver its own verdict to the EP, together with an accompanying explanation. The 
Parliament then enters a ‘second reading’ stage, at which it can either approve the Council’s changes 
(in which case the law is passed), amend them, or reject the law outright. All the while, the 
Commission will also be giving its opinions on suggested amendments and, if it rejects any, the 
Council must vote to approve the amended law unanimously, rather than by a majority. If, on the 
other hand, a stalemate between the Parliament and Council lasts more than three months, the 
presidents of the two institutions may convene a conciliation committee, made up of equal numbers 
of MEPs and Council members, to broker a compromise. 
This drawn-out, to some overly bureaucratic, approach to law-making—renamed the ‘ordinary 
legislative procedure’ (OLP) under Lisbon—used to exist in relation to only a few areas, such as 
health, culture, science, sport, and some aspects of asylum policy. But Lisbon extended it to most 
others—including agriculture, transport, and decisions over how to allocate European structural 
funds. The Parliament also has powers to legislate in relation to the smooth operation of the 
‘eurozone’ and, crucially, veto the EU budget. And (subject to agreement with the Council of 
Ministers) it may take action over other aspects of economic policy: in July 2010, the Parliament 
passed legislation capping bankers’ bonuses. Since January 2011, upfront cash bonuses have been 
limited to a quarter of the total (or 20 per cent for ‘particularly large’ bonuses), with 40–60 per cent 
deferred. In a move designed to deter excessive risk-taking by bankers, the rules also stipulated that 
at least half the total bonus should be paid as ‘contingent capital’—meaning that it would be the first 
money to be called upon in the case of future debt or liquidity problems. On 1 January 2014, new 
rules were also introduced to cap bonuses at no more than 100 per cent of bankers’ annual salaries, 
or twice that level if shareholders explicitly approved after being approved by the Parliament. 
Despite its title, when originally christened in 1958, the EP’s representatives were not elected at 
all, but appointed—one by each member country. But, since 1979, it has been fully elected. By the 
time of its first election, the number of representatives—today known as members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs)—had increased from 142 to 410. 
The current membership numbers 751. Elections are held every five years and, prior to 1999, 
were conducted on a ‘first-past-the-post’ (FPTP) system analogous to that used in UK general 
elections (see 4.2.1). The European Parliament Act 1999 changed this by introducing proportional 
representation (PR), generally based on the party list system. Parties are now awarded a number of 
seats proportional to their share of the vote. 
Britain is currently divided into twelve European electoral regions (including Northern Ireland, 
which uses the Single Transferrable Vote/STV—see 4.5.2). Each region returns between three and 
ten MEPs, depending on its population. There are seventy-two British MEPs altogether (down from 
seventy-eight since the recent enlargements): fifty-nine in England, six in Scotland, four in Wales, 
and three in Northern Ireland. 
Like the Commission, the European Parliament has its own president, elected by absolute 
majority in a secret ballot of members for renewable two-and-a-half-year terms, and its principal 
base is in Brussels, where it sits for three weeks a month. For the other week, its members travel to 
Strasbourg in France, convening in an identical chamber (a long-time cause of controversy, given the 
relocation costs involved). 
As in Britain’s Parliament, MEPs sit in political groupings reflecting their ideological affiliations, 
rather than regional or national delegations. 
Following the June 2015 formation of a new alliance of right-wing parties, the Europe of Nations 
and Freedom (ENF), led by Marine le Pen’s Front National, There are currently eight political 
groupings. At the time of writing, though, fifteen MEPs remained ‘non-attached’ (‘non-inscrit’). 
The groupings sit at designated points around the ‘hemispherical’ (semi-circular) parliamentary 
chamber, according to their notional position on the Left–Right political spectrum. Communist 
MEPs will therefore sit to the far left of the central seat occupied by the Parliament’s president, while 
fascists and extreme Right parties occupy seats on the far right. 
To be recognized as a legitimate grouping (and, since 2011, entitled to additional funding), an 
interparty alliance needs to number at least twenty-five MEPs from a minimum of seven member 
states. The current political groupings are: 
 European People’s Party (EPP)—215 members; 
 Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D)—189 members; 
 Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)—67 members; 
 The Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA)—50 members; 
 European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)—74 members; 
 European United Left/Nordic Green Left (EUL/NGL)—52 members; 
 Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD)—46 members; and 
 Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF)―39 members. 
While Britain’s Labour Party has long been part of the socialist grouping, after much internal debate 
the Conservatives acted on a long-standing promise to pull out of the centre-right EPP after the June 
2009 European elections. Mr Cameron, who had made this pledge a central plank of his 2005 
campaign for the party’s leadership, announced the formation of the European Conservatives and 
Reformists (ECR): a Eurosceptic alliance including several ‘extremist’ parties, among them Poland’s 
Law and Justice Party (which draws much of its support from ultra-conservative Catholics) and 
Latvia’s Fatherland and Freedom Party, which counts among its members former recruits to Hitler’s 
Waffen SS. The Tories’ decision to quit the EPP earned it barbs from centre-right European leaders 
including then French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. 
EP administrative functions are overseen by yet another layer of EU bureaucracy: a ‘bureau’ run 
by the president, fourteen vice-presidents, and five ‘quaestors’ (civil servants responsible for 
accounting matters directly affecting MEPs themselves). All these officials are elected, like the 
president, for two-and-a-half years at a time. 
9.3.3 The Council of Ministers 
The Council of the European Union (or Council of Ministers) is the single most powerful EU 
institution. Comprising departmental ministers from each of the twenty-eight member states, its 
precise composition varies according to the issue being debated on a given day. If the Council is 
debating health policy, a health minister from each member state will attend, while discussions about 
crime, policing, and security will involve interior ministers (in Britain’s case, the Home Secretary or 
another Home Office minister). 
The Council has ten ‘configurations’, reflecting the broad policy areas under its jurisdiction: 
 General Affairs; 
 Foreign Affairs; 
 Economic and Financial Affairs; 
 Justice and Home Affairs; 
 Employment, Social Policy, Health, and Consumer Affairs; 
 Competitiveness; 
 Transport, Telecommunications, and Energy; 
 Agriculture and Fisheries; 
 Environment; and 
 Education, Youth, Culture, and Sport. 
Although policy ideas are often proactively proposed by the Commission, all but the most minor 
must be formally approved by the Council to make them ‘law’. To this end, it is supported by a 
related institution, the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), comprising civil 
servants or ambassadors seconded from each member state (and itself backed by another 150 
committees and working groups). 
All Council meetings are chaired by a senior politician (normally the president or prime minister) 
from the country currently holding the rotating EU presidency. Britain last held the presidency in 
2005. In view of the need for continuity emphasized by this rota, the Council has its own dedicated 
civil service: the General Secretariat of the Council. 
9.3.3.1 Qualified majority voting (QMV) 
The voting system used in the Council is complex and, as such, warrants its own section, given its 
importance in determining the direction of EU policy. 
Unanimous approval by member states is normally required to pass major decisions with 
implications for the future of the EU—such as whether to admit additional countries into the Union. 
The annual confirmation of the EU’s Budget also traditionally requires unanimity. Since Maastricht, 
however, an increasing number of (often significant) decisions have been agreed through a process 
known as qualified majority voting (QMV). As its name suggests, the premise of QMV is for 
policy agreements to be reached without the need for every member state’s approval—that is, on a 
majority basis. This majority system is ‘qualified’, however, in two respects: 
 Member states are not accorded an equal say in the Council; rather, the number of votes 
allocated to each is weighted to reflect its population size, giving some countries greater clout 
than others. 
 A simple majority system (like that which determines whether Acts are passed in the UK 
Parliament) used to require only one more ‘Yes’ vote than the total number of ‘No’ votes, but 
this system was later amended to stipulate that decisions needed the backing of 74.8 per cent 
of weighted votes in the Council (258 out of 345), representing 62 per cent of the EU’s 
population (on the request of a member state). As of 1 November 2014, the bar has been 
raised even higher, though, and today a ‘qualified majority’, requires a ‘double majority’ to 
be achieved for a motion to be carried. In other words, at least 55 per cent of member states 
(fifteen countries), representing 65 per cent or more of the EU’s population, must have 
approved it—with a minimum of four states needing to join forces to block it. The rationale 
behind this new variant of QMV is that it is ‘fairer’ both to larger and smaller countries: by 
weighting decisions to take account of both states with large populations and the sovereign 
voting rights of individual countries, no matter how small. Although this system is now 
firmly established, between 2014 and 31 March 2017 any member state was still within its 
rights to request that the old one be used. 
Of the bigger states, France, Britain, Germany, and Italy presently have the most votes, with twenty-
nine apiece. The least populated country, Malta, has just three. The overall breakdown of vote 
allocations under QMV is spelt out in table 9B to be found on the Online Resource Centre. 
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, QMV remains divisive. Some smaller states continue to complain of having 
policies foisted on them—regardless of their views—by more heavily populated ones. Eurosceptics, 
meanwhile, see the absence of a ‘one member, one vote’ system as evidence that individual countries 
are increasingly being subsumed within an embryonic ‘European superstate’, rather than treated as a 
confederation of independent (and equal) countries. 
9.3.4 The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
Established in 1952, the Court of Justice of the European Union—formerly the European Court of 
Justice―is the EU’s supreme legal institution. Unlike other bodies, it is based in Luxembourg City, 
but like them it has its own president (appointed by fellow judges on a renewable three-year term). 
Again like the other key EU institutions, the Court comprises twenty-eight members: one judge 
per member state. For practical reasons, a maximum of fifteen judges will usually hear a case at any 
one time, sitting as a ‘grand chamber’. The judges are assisted by eleven advocates-general: lawyers 
tasked with presenting to them impartial ‘opinions’ on individual cases. Judgments are made in a 
collegiate way and must be unanimous. 
Judges are nominated by the member states from which they hail, on renewable six-year terms. 
Six advocates-general are nominated by the biggest EU member states—Britain, France, Germany, 
Italy, Spain, and Poland—with the others rotating in alphabetical order between the remaining 
twenty-two. Under Lisbon, it is possible for eleven advocates-general to be enlisted, if the Court 
requests this. 
The Court may be required to pass judgment in a variety of circumstances—for example, if there 
is evidence that a member state has not implemented a treaty or directive or if a complainant alleges 
that a governmental institution, non-government organization (NGO), or commercial business has in 
some other way broken EU law. 
Areas of EU law covered include: 
 free trade and the movement of goods and services in the EU single market; 
 employment law and the European Social Chapter; 
 competition law (cartels, monopolies, mergers, and acquisitions); and 
 public sector regulation. 
In practice, it is unusual for a case involving an individual or small group of individuals to go before 
the Court of Justice itself. And even when a case is heard in this way, this will often be by a smaller 
chamber of three or five judges. Only in exceptional cases (such as when an EU commissioner is 
alleged to have seriously failed to fulfil his or her obligations) will it ever sit as a grand chamber, and 
even then only as a quorum of fifteen judges—rather than the full complement of twenty-eight. 
In lesser cases, hearings are convened by a junior body established in 1988 to deal with the 
growing number of routine complaints being generated as the EU extended its influence: the General 
Court (until Lisbon, the ‘Court of First Instance’). Today this boasts thirty-eight judges (at least one 
from each member state) and a president appointed by them for renewable three-year terms. Again, 
cases may either be heard by smaller chambers (of one, three, or five judges) or, if legally complex, a 
grand chamber of fifteen. Unlike the main Court of Justice, however, the General Court has no 
advocates-general, so a judge from among its own number is sometimes nominated to this role. A 
‘judge-rapporteur’ will also be appointed to oversee proceedings and draft a provisional judgment—
to be deliberated on by the judges—after hearing representations from complainant and respondent. 
The General Court’s responsibilities encompass the following policy areas: 
 agriculture; 
 state aid; 
 competition; 
 commercial policy; 
 regional policy; 
 social policy; 
 institutional law; 
 trademark law; and 
 transport. 
It has the authority to impose various penalties, as outlined in table 9C to be found on the Online 
Resource Centre. 
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Judgments by the General Court are subject to appeals to the Court of Justice. In addition to the 
General Court, two further courts exist to deal with more specific cases: the Civil Service Tribunal, 
which handles complaints about maladministration by EU employees, and the Court of Auditors, 
which oversees its accounts. 
For individual member states, the extent to which European law can be said to take precedence 
over national legislatures, judiciaries, and (where relevant) constitutions has been a subject of intense 
interest and ongoing debate. In recent years, however, a series of landmark Court judgments have 
pointed towards a growing sense that the EU holds supreme. In 1999, Mr Blair’s government faced a 
compensation bill of up to £100 million after the ECJ ruled that Margaret Thatcher had broken 
European law by passing a 1988 Act intended to ban Spanish trawlermen from using UK-registered 
boats to fish in UK waters—a practice known as ‘quota-hopping’. The final judgment in this case, 
known as Factortame (after the name of one of the 100-plus Spanish fishing companies that brought 
the original action), came only after a decade of legal ping-pong between London and Luxembourg. 
Several ‘test case’ rulings have focused on the scope of EU employment law—in particular, the 
extent to which commercial companies and other non-government organizations can be bound by it. 
In the 1986 case M. H. Marshall v. Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority, 
Ms Marshall sued her employer after being dismissed from her job on reaching the then State 
Pension age for women (sixty). She argued that this contravened the 1976 Equal Treatment 
Directive, because men were not expected to retire before the age of sixty-five and the Directive 
created rights that could be enforced ‘horizontally’ between individuals. The then ECJ ruled against 
this interpretation—stipulating that directives generally applied only ‘vertically’ (that is, through the 
aegis of the specific individuals or organizations at whom they were directed). However, there was a 
silver lining for Ms Marshall: because the health authority employing her was ‘an organ of the state’ 
(meaning that it was bound by the Directive on a vertical basis), she still won her case. 
Some judgments have proved so momentous that new legal concepts have been named after 
them: in 1991, a group of Italian workers who lost their jobs when their employer became insolvent 
successfully sued the country’s government for failing to implement the 1980 Insolvency Protection 
Directive, which would have guaranteed them compensation. The ECJ’s ruling in favour of the 
workers established the principle of member states being liable for compliance with EU law by all 
bodies based on their soil, including private companies. This has been christened the ‘Frankovich 
principle’ (after the surname of one victor). 
But not all ECJ rulings have gone the claimant’s way, and some outcomes suggest a rather less 
clear-cut balance of power between UK courts and the EU. In the 1974 case Van Duyn v. Home 
Office, the ECJ found in favour of Britain after a Dutch national, Yvonne Van Duyn, sued under the 
Treaty of Rome for being denied entry to the country because she was a practising Scientologist. The 
Court ruled that member states could bar individuals on the basis of their ‘personal conduct’ if this 
conflicted with national ‘public policy’ objectives—and UK policy was to prevent the spread of 
Scientology. More significantly, in 1993, the German judicial system successfully asserted its 
supremacy over the EU in internal constitutional matters. In Brunner v. the European Union Treaty, 
the German Constitutional Court ruled that it was for it alone to determine whether European laws, 
and the powers conferred on individual Union institutions, were compatible with Germany’s 
constitution. And, in a warning similar to Mr Cameron’s refusal to cede any further powers to the EU 
without consulting the British public first, it ruled that the country would not be bound by any 
interpretation of the Treaty that extended the Union’s overall remit (or kompetenz), or any laws 
subsequently adopted by the EU that increased its existing powers—unless German law decided such 
laws should apply. 
9.3.5 The European Council 
For many years referred to as the ‘European Summit’ (to avoid confusion with the Council of 
Ministers), the European Council finally gained official status as an EU governing institution in the 
Lisbon Treaty. Composed of heads of state or government of all member states, it meets up to four 
times a year, usually in the Justus Lipsius Building in Brussels: headquarters of the Council of 
Ministers. 
The Council is today chaired by a full-time, ‘permanent’ president of the European Council 
selected by members for up two terms of two-and-a-half years. The present incumbent, former Polish 
prime minister Donald Tusk, was due to end his first term on 31 May 2017. 
Under new rules, presidents must now reflect the political complexion of the European 
Parliament at any given time. Previously, chairmanship of the Council rotated between member 
states, with individual heads of government taking it in turns to hold it for six months at a time, in 
tandem with their parallel presidency of the Council of Ministers. While the European Council has 
no legislative power (unlike its near-namesake), a member state may complain formally to it if it 
disputes a decision taken in the Council of Ministers, under ‘emergency brake’ procedures. The 
Council may then choose to settle the matter by holding its own vote—giving it what some observers 
see as the ultimate veto over disputed EU policy. Since Lisbon, it has also been charged officially 
with mapping the EU’s overall future strategic direction. 
In February 2016, Mr Cameron negotiated a partial ‘emergency brake’ for Britain, in his frantic 
efforts to appease Eurosceptics over one of the most contentious aspect of EU policy, ahead of the 
then impending referendum (see 9.7): the ‘free movement’ of people (and, specifically, mobility of 
labour) between member states. Right-wing critics, including the United Kingdom Independence 
Party (UKIP), elements of the press, and many of his Tory colleagues, had long argued that the 
influx of economic migrants from poorer EU states over previous years had been motivated, in part, 
by the supposed generosity of Britain’s welfare system (see Chapter 7). To allay concerns about 
‘benefit tourism’, Mr Cameron secured permission to restrict access to in-work benefits for new 
migrant workers for up to four years—but only in circumstances when inward migration had been of 
‘exceptional magnitude’ and ‘over an extended period of time’. His attempt to portray the deal as a 
breakthrough was further undermined by other caveats—including the fact that the new 
arrangements apply to all EU states (not just Britain) and can only be invoked at times when a 
sustained inflow of foreign workers is shown to have damaged ‘essential aspects’ of a country’s 
social security system; put ‘exceptional pressure’ on its public services; or caused problems in its 
employment market. 
9.4 Evolution of the euro 
Moves towards some form of single European currency quietly fermented for decades. But what 
started out as the seed of an idea in the minds of European commissioners in the late 1960s took 
some thirty years to reach fruition. 
9.4.1 The exchange rate mechanism (ERM) debacle and ‘Black 
Wednesday’ 
The first tentative moves towards economic and monetary union (EMU) in the EU began in 1979, 
when, in an effort to curb inflation, encourage trade, and stabilize exchange rates between individual 
member states, it introduced the exchange rate mechanism (ERM). The ERM was based on the idea 
of fixing narrower margins between which the relative values of individual states’ currencies would 
be permitted to fluctuate—effectively ‘pegging’ one country’s exchange rate to another’s. Before the 
ERM, bilateral exchange rates between EU states were based on the European currency unit (ecu), a 
‘virtual’ European currency traded in stock markets. As a condition of EU membership, states were 
required to contain fluctuations in the value of their currencies within a 2.25 per cent margin either 
side of their bilateral exchange rates (except Italy, which was allowed a variance of up to 6 per cent). 
The Maastricht Treaty envisaged the European monetary system (EMS) moving towards full 
monetary union in three stages, as set out in table 9D to be found on the Online Resource Centre. 
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As with many EU innovations, Britain was slow to sign up. It finally did so in 1990, when Mr Major 
was Chancellor, but his successor, Norman Lamont, pulled out dramatically on 16 September 1992, 
after a panic-stricken day of stock market speculation and interest rate hikes. 
‘Black Wednesday’—as it came to be known—arose out of the unsustainable position of the 
British currency (the pound sterling) during the months after the country signed up to the ERM. 
Throughout much of the 1980s, Margaret Thatcher’s Chancellor Nigel Lawson had ‘shadowed’ the 
German Deutschmark when deciding whether to raise or lower interest rates to maintain sterling’s 
value. By September 1992, this had had the effect of valuing sterling unrealistically high compared 
to the US dollar. Because many British exports were valued in dollars, not sterling, the UK was 
potentially losing considerable income from overseas markets by allowing the gap between dollar 
and pound to widen. But with Britain pegged to the ecu in the ERM, there was limited room for the 
Chancellor to ‘devalue’ sterling (as he otherwise might have done) to remedy this. 
The approaching crisis reached its tipping point when US speculators, including billionaire 
George Soros, began frenziedly borrowing pounds and selling them for Deutschmarks in mid-
September, in the belief that sterling was about to be devalued and that they could therefore profit by 
repaying their loans at deflated prices. This prompted Mr Lamont to raise interest rates from 10 to 12 
per cent on 16 September alone (with the ‘promise’ of a further increase, to 15 per cent, later the 
same day), to stop sterling’s value falling too far by tempting speculators to buy pounds. But, 
apparently disbelieving him, speculators continued selling pounds in anticipation of a slump in value. 
With sterling plummeting as a consequence, at 7 p.m. Mr Lamont withdrew Britain from the 
ERM: freezing temporarily interest rates at 12 per cent, rather than raising them to the promised 15 
per cent. During the course of a single day, he had spent billions of pounds of foreign currency 
reserves propping up the pound. By the time the Conservatives lost to Labour five years later, the 
ultimate cost to the taxpayer of ‘Black Wednesday’ was £3.3 billion, according to Treasury papers 
released in 2005. The Tories’ previous reputation for economic competence was dealt a body blow 
by the events of that day, from which it took years to recover. 
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9.4.2 The launch of the euro and growth of the eurozone 
The euro (€) has existed in ‘non-physical’ form—in the guise of travellers’ cheques, electronic 
transfers, etc.—since 1 January 1999, but it officially came into being on 1 January 2002, when the 
European Central Bank (ECB) in Frankfurt began issuing notes and coins in the twelve EU 
member states that had signed up to join. At the time, there were only fifteen EU states, and 
membership of the euro has since been extended to include seven of the additional thirteen countries 
admitted through enlargement: Malta, Cyprus, Slovenia, Estonia, Slovakia, Latvia, and Lithuania 
(the newest member, having joined on 1 January 2015). Of the ‘original’ fifteen EU members, 
Britain, Sweden, and Denmark are the only three to have resisted joining. Both Swedish and Danish 
populations have rejected the single currency in national referendums (the latter twice), and the 
former has since circumvented any pressure from ‘eurozone’ states to make a fresh attempt to join 
them by failing to adhere to the ‘convergence criteria’ that countries are expected to meet before 
being accepted into the euro. 
The main convergence criteria, designed to promote price stability across participating states, 
require an applicant to achieve the following: 
 an inflation rate no more than 1.5 per cent higher than that of the three lowest-inflation 
member states of the EU; 
 a ratio of no more than 3 per cent between annual government deficit and gross domestic 
product (GDP) at the end of the preceding tax year; 
 a ratio of gross government debt to GDP no greater than 60 per cent at the end of the 
preceding tax year (although it is sometimes acceptable to approach this target); 
 membership of the successor to the original ERM—‘ERM II’—for at least two consecutive 
years without at any point simultaneously devaluing the applicant’s currency; and 
 nominal long-term interest rates no more than 2 per cent higher than that of the three lowest-
inflation EU member states. 
At time of writing, the nineteen countries in the eurozone were (in alphabetical order): Austria, 
Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. In addition, several 
European states outside the EU now using the euro—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—have 
all signed formal agreements allowing them to issue their own euro coinage, while Andorra has a 
monetary agreement with the Union allowing it to do so, and aspiring EU members Kosovo and 
Montenegro have adopted it as their official currency, but without any formal recognition allowing 
them to mint coins. 
Britain has always remained a refusenik. Mr Major’s government negotiated an ‘opt-out 
protocol’ before belatedly signing Maastricht—removing any obligation on its part to move from 
stage two to stage three of EMU. Mr Blair repeatedly promised to hold a referendum before 
committing the UK to the single currency (of which they was thought to be broadly in favour). In 
practice, however, any hope of doing so was thwarted by the insistence of his Chancellor, Mr Brown, 
that Britain would have to meet five (somewhat nebulous) ‘economic tests’ before it was safe to 
sacrifice the strength of sterling to the untested vagaries of the euro. 
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9.4.3 The ‘sovereign debt crisis’ 
Because several EU member states have yet to join the single currency, the Union has often been 
described as a ‘two-speed’ Europe. Until recently, many observers argued that (whatever their 
preferences) a time would one day come when Britain and all other member states outside the euro 
would be forced to join—if only to retain their influence at the negotiating table over other issues 
affecting the Union. 
However, tumultuous recent events in the eurozone sparked by sovereign debt crises in several 
member states—notably the dismissively termed ‘PIGS’ economies of Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and 
Spain—only sharpened opposition to joining within Britain’s political establishment. Sparked, in 
part, by the 2008–9 banking collapse (see 7.3.4), there have been so many twists in this escalating 
emergency that it is impossible to give a definitive account of it here. Nonetheless, it would be 
remiss not to include a broad overview of the origins of the crisis and its most immediate 
ramifications. 
In May 2010, the euro was plunged into the biggest slump in its short history after first Greece, 
then several other EU states using the single currency, became the subject of intense concern over 
the extent of their ‘sovereign debt’: the individual budget deficits they had accumulated following 
the global financial meltdown and (in some cases) their previous levels of borrowing. 
Trouble began in Greece, where a package of austerity measures unveiled by the then 
government provoked a wave of wildcat public sector strikes and violent demonstrations. Financial 
ratings agency Standard & Poor’s swiftly reduced the status of the country’s government bonds to 
‘junk’. To contain Greece’s downturn—preventing it from having a knock-on effect on the euro and, 
by extension, other states’ economies—on 2 May the eurozone countries teamed up with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to offer the country an unprecedented €110 billion (£93 billion) 
loan bailout, on condition that it imposed harsh domestic spending cuts. Within a week, though, a 
further massive cash injection was required to stabilize the euro. This saw Europe’s finance ministers 
collectively approve a loans package worth £624 billion aimed at ensuring financial stability across 
Europe by shoring up the sixteen states by that point struggling to service their debts. In one of his 
last actions as Chancellor, Labour’s Alistair Darling signed off the deal—committing Britain to 
providing between £9.6 billion and £13 billion to support a new £95 billion ‘stabilization 
mechanism’ designed to stop individual countries’ economies collapsing. 
In ensuing weeks, governments in a succession of other eurozone states, including Spain, 
Portugal, and Italy, began implementing similar austerity. But as international money markets 
indicated a new wariness towards the previously unassailable euro, the crisis came closer to home, as 
Ireland had to accept a joint €85 billion (£71 billion) bailout by the IMF and the eurozone countries. 
The following two years saw more bailouts—and further waves of painful austerity in states 
forced to accept them. In unprecedented scenes, two countries paralysed by their deepening debt 
problems, Greece and Italy, formed temporary governments led by so-called ‘technocrats’: unelected 
officials with extensive professional experience of working in the financial sector, but no democratic 
mandate. Central to the often fraught negotiations among member states—including Britain and 
others outside the euro—was the question of how far the country with the strongest economy, 
Germany, was willing to ‘prop up’ those in crisis to avoid collapse of the eurozone. At various 
stages, the idea was mooted that Greece (the state in the weakest financial position) might be forced 
to ‘default’ on its debt, or even withdraw from the euro and/or EU altogether. This would allow it to 
devalue in the hope of boosting export areas, such as tourism and shipping, in which it had a 
‘comparative advantage’ (defined in economics as goods or services that a country can afford to 
produce at lower marginal costs than its competitors). 
At the height of the sovereign debt storm, in December 2011, eurozone members led by Germany 
and France proposed a twin-pronged strategy for limiting the likelihood of future financial crises on 
the scale of that which had begun three years earlier. The first element was a new Fiscal Compact, 
which (although boycotted by Britain and the Czech Republic) now effectively allows the ECB to 
vet individual member states’ national budget plans. Officially entitled the ‘Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination, and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union’, the Compact requires all 
signatories to introduce into their domestic laws formal requirements that future governments keep 
their annual budgets in balance or surplus. Any state breaking this pledge will be fined 0.1 per cent 
of its GDP by the ECJ. The Compact was eventually ratified by sixteen signatories (four more than 
the required twelve) and came into force in those states on 1 January 2013. The second element of 
this eurozone ‘firewall’ would be a EU ‘financial transaction tax’ (FTT), which, if enacted according 
to the EC’s proposals, will see a charge of 0.1 per cent imposed against the exchange of shares and 
bonds, and 0.01 per cent against derivatives contracts transacted between financial institutions in all 
signatory states. The FTT has, however, been the subject of protracted, and ever more tortuous, 
negotiations and legal challenges—notably from the UK, whose financial centre in the City of 
London, critics argue, could be disproportionately affected by it, despite Britain’s refusal to sign up 
to the levy. It was the proposal to raise some €57 billion a year through the FTT, more than the 
planned Compact, that prompted Mr Cameron to stage his equally celebrated and derided ‘walkout’ 
from negotiations in December 2011. At time of writing, agreement appeared to be as elusive as ever 
on the timetable for implementing a FTT, or indeed what form it would finally take, following 
repeated postponements of its introduction—the latest taking it to at least September 2016. Nearly 
seven years down the line, meanwhile, the underlying sovereign debt crisis is far from over. Though 
it is widely agreed that a certain amount of stability has finally returned to the eurozone, one long-
term reform still favoured by some member states (but viewed cautiously by Germany) is for an 
additional bulwark against future financial collapse to be introduced, in the form of a eurozone-wide 
‘banking union’ to supplement the extant financial one. This would offer centralized deposit 
insurance guarantees, bank regulation, and mechanisms allowing for future failing banks to be 
recapitalized, if necessary, from joint eurozone funds. 
9.5 Towards an EU ‘superstate’? 
The EU-related concern that has preoccupied Britain’s political classes more than any other over the 
years has been the perceived shift over time from what was once little more than a trading alliance 
between fully independent nation states towards a closer, more all-embracing ‘political’ union akin 
to the United States of America. By the late 1980s, the perception that many mainland European 
countries (particularly France and Germany) wanted to create a ‘European superstate’ or ‘United 
States of Europe’ was meeting staunch resistance from Mrs Thatcher and other Eurosceptic ministers 
to almost any prospect of further UK involvement. Famously, during a 1990 Commons debate on 
then EC President Jacques Delors’ plans to accelerate EU integration, she declared ‘No, no, no’. 
Although, as leader of the Opposition, Mrs Thatcher had supported the ‘Yes’ campaign for 
Britain to remain in the then EEC, by the end of her premiership she saw things differently. Not only 
had the pace of integration accelerated by that point, but the likes of Mr Delors and German 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl were championing ever-closer ties between member states, with the 
contents of the Maastricht Treaty a particular concern. High-profile resignations by pro-European 
Cabinet colleagues, such as Chancellor Nigel Lawson and Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe, did 
little to dent her resolve. It was the Tories’ growing internal rift over Europe as much as the Poll Tax 
riots that led to her ultimate downfall (see 3.1.3.4). 
Despite producing a more mild-mannered replacement, the ensuing leadership election failed to 
heal party wounds. Mr Major did much to placate his Eurosceptic colleagues: in particular, 
negotiating British opt-outs to various clauses in Maastricht, notably the Social Chapter enshrining 
new rights for EU workers, including the Working Time Directive barring employers from forcing 
staff to work more than forty-eight hours a week (later signed by Mr Blair). 
But such fillips to the Right could only delay an inevitable confrontation over Maastricht (which 
effectively had to be signed if Britain were to remain in the EU). By May 1992, having just secured a 
narrow fourth successive Tory victory, Mr Major was effectively held to ransom by a hard core of 
Eurosceptic backbenchers, known collectively as the ‘Maastricht rebels’. Only by temporarily 
withdrawing the whip from these MPs, forging a fractious alliance with the Ulster Unionists and 
Democratic Unionists, and threatening his party with a further election (which it would almost 
certainly have lost) did he force through the European Communities (Amendment) Bill on a wafer-
thin majority. Among those actively rebelling from the backbenches were bullish former 
Employment Secretary Lord Tebbit and one Mrs Thatcher. In addition to the usual suspects, such as 
stalwart Eurosceptic Bill Cash, the rebels included no fewer than three future Coalition ministers: 
David Willetts, Liam Fox, and Iain Duncan Smith. 
It was to be a dozen years or more before the furore over Maastricht came close to being 
matched: this time over another supposedly ‘red-line’ proposal, the draft 2004 Constitutional Treaty 
(dubbed the ‘EU Constitution’ by critics—see 9.5). Though ultimately supplanted by the Lisbon 
Treaty, of all EU agreements this putative deal was the one that most clearly enshrined the concept of 
subsidiarity: the antithesis of federalism, the US-style multi-state system of government so feared 
by the defenders of British sovereignty. The EU definition of subsidiarity defines member states as 
paramount and the Union as only a ‘last port of call’ should individual countries’ self-determination 
falter. The Constitutional Treaty also set out, for the first time, practical exit strategies for states keen 
to withdraw from the EU altogether. Nonetheless, under mounting pressure from the Tories and his 
own backbenchers, Mr Blair promised a referendum on it if he were to win a third term in the 2005 
election (although, by then, his pledge was redundant, as both France and the Netherlands had, by 
then, already rejected it). 
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Lisbon (to all intents and purposes a rewrite of the ill-fated ‘Constitution’) also proved divisive. Yet, 
after months of pressure from his own backbenchers and a Commons debate lasting twelve days, Mr 
Blair’s successor, Mr Brown, formally settled the issue in February 2008 with a slim victory 
approving ratification on a three-line whip. With twenty-nine Labour MPs defying the party whip by 
backing a referendum, it was only then Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg’s decision to whip his 
MPs into abstaining (rather than opposing the government) that carried the day for the prime 
minister. In doing so, he angered some in his own ranks: three frontbenchers resigned and fifteen 
voted for a referendum, despite his using a three-line whip to discipline them. While Lisbon 
ultimately had a smoother passage than the abortive Constitution, Britain was not the only country to 
have trouble ratifying it. On 13 June 2008, the only EU nation granted a referendum, Ireland, 
rejected it by 53.4 to 46.6 per cent (paving the way for a failed last-ditch attempt by Tory peers to 
delay it in the Lords). Facing the threat of isolation or, worse, expulsion from the EU, Ireland finally 
approved the treaty in October 2009. But it was not until December that year—eighteen months after 
it had been signed by EU leaders—that it came into force. 
9.6 Other issues facing the EU 
Before turning to the question of the UK’s decision to leave the EU, it is worth giving some space to 
a brief consideration of some of the contentious issues relating to its membership—aside from those, 
like monetary union, we have already examined. The most significant are summarized in Table 9.2. 
Table 9.2 Major issues facing Britain’s membership of the EU 
Issue  Explanation 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and 
the British rebate 
CAP takes biggest annual chunk of EU 
Budget—equivalent to 44% of spending 
each year. Mrs Thatcher negotiated 
generous yearly rebate for Britain from 
CAP and other subsidies in late 1980s, 
because UK receives less than more 
farming-dependent states. In December 
2005, Mr Blair accepted £1bn annual cut 
in Britain’s £3.6bn rebate following row 
with French President Mr Chirac that 
briefly paralysed EU Budget negotiations. 
His opponents argued that increased 
subsidies from richer western European 
countries were needed to help new 
members: e.g. ex-Soviet countries. 
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) Long-standing protection of European fish 
and seafood stocks using ‘quota’ system 
for fishing rights, allocated among 
relevant member states. In mid-1990s, 
frequent confrontations occurred between 
Britain and Spain over ‘quota-hopping’: 
Spanish trawlers’ alleged practice of 
fishing in British waters using boats 
registered under third-country ‘flags of 
convenience’, so they could exceed 
Spain’s quota. Many UK trawlermen 
scrapped boats because of strict quotas 
introduced in British waters. 
Common Defence Policy Concept of greater cooperation over 
defence formally introduced in 
Maastricht. Idea of EU ‘Rapid Reaction 
Force’ designed to intervene swiftly if 
member state threatened or invaded still 
on table. 
Economic migration EU expansion to encompass former 
Eastern Bloc countries led to more 
economic migration from poorer to richer 
countries, fostered by free movement of 
labour enshrined in various treaties. 
Community relations and public services 
strained in some areas—creating tensions 
between migrants and indigenous peoples. 
In 2007, Britain became first member 
state to introduce new restrictions on 
migrant workers from two newest EU 
entrants: Bulgaria and Romania (removed 
in 2014). Curbs on free access to NHS and 
‘emergency brake’ allowing government 
to limit in-work benefits for new migrants 
negotiated by Britain. 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) 
Modelled on existing Trans-Pacific Trade 
Partnership (TPTC) between United 
States and twelve Pacific Rim countries, 
this proposed deal would introduce new 
US/EU-wide free trade zone. Still under 
prolonged negotiation, it would cover 
three broad areas: access to markets for 
US and EU firms; regulation; and other 
rules and principles underpinning trade 
within and between the two blocs. Critics 
warn TTIP could prioritize profit and 
economic growth over environmental 
protection, and some fear it could promote 
further privatization of public services, 
like the NHS (see Chapter 6), by forcing 
them to operate like other free markets 
and enabling firms to sue for loss of 
contracts and access to those restricted to 
government and/or charitable providers. 
9.7 Brexit 
In hindsight, Britain’s impending departure from the EU has been a long time coming. As much of 
this chapter has demonstrated, UK governments—representing an island state located on the far 
north-western fringes of the European continent—have generally been lukewarm, if not decidedly 
frosty, in their dealings with the Union. And this ambivalence is hardly unreciprocated. Decades 
after those infamous tussles between Macmillan and de Gaulle, and Mrs Thatcher’s run-ins with Mr 
Delores, member states’ collective response to the 2016 referendum result was most memorably 
symbolized by EC president Mr Juncker’s quip that, while Britain’s exit was unlikely to be ‘an 
amicable divorce’, the years of its membership had hardly been a ‘tight love affair’. 
But how and why did the referendum come about in the first place—and what does the short- to 
medium-term hold for Britain, now that the country has voted to go it alone? Though it is impossible 
to give any kind of definitive account of the origins of ‘Brexit’ in a book of this nature, it would be 
fair to attribute it, in large part, to the longstanding divisions within the Conservative Party over the 
pace and trajectory of EU integration in recent decades. Back in the 1990s, at the time of the 
Maastricht debacle (see 9.5), these divisions had been framed primarily around questions of 
sovereignty: specifically, the perceived erosion of the primacy of the Westminster Parliament by 
increasingly assertive EU institutions. But by the time the Tories returned to power in 2010, after 
thirteen years of Labour government, this issue had been eclipsed by another factor which, if 
anything, proved even more of an influence on the eventual outcome of the European ‘debate’: 
immigration or, to put it correctly, economic migration (otherwise known as freedom of 
movement/mobility of labour). During the intervening years, Conservative Eurosceptics had been 
emboldened by the growing fear of losing ground to Nigel Farage’s UKIP. By gradually insinuating 
itself into the political mainstream, UKIP had successfully mobilized an unholy alliance of flag-
waving ‘little Englanders’ from the Tory shires and disaffected white, working-class voters (many of 
them former Labour loyalists) who had come to feel buffeted by a toxic mix of global market forces 
and competition from migrant workers for the same (often scarce) jobs and public services. In short, 
UKIP’s time had come. What had started out as an anti-EU protest movement redolent of the short-
lived Referendum Party that helped send several prominent Tories packing in 1997 had, by 2010, 
transformed itself into a formidable (if often unruly and outrageous) electoral force. 
While in coalition with the Europhile Lib Dems, it proved impossible for Mr Cameron to stage 
the ‘in-out referendum’ he had long mooted as a means of silencing his party’s Eurosceptics 
(whatever the result). Having pledged to do so in his 2015 manifesto, however, no such get-out 
clause awaited him when the Tories unexpectedly clawed their way to a slim parliamentary majority 
that May. Although it only managed to secure a single seat in the general election itself (for Douglas 
Carswell, one of two ex-Tory MPs who had defected the previous year), UKIP was by this point 
Britain’s biggest party in the European Parliament, having surged from third place in 2009 to win 
twenty-four seats to Labour’s twenty and the Tories’ nineteen in 2014. Not only that: its Westminster 
candidates had come second to Labour in a string of formerly solid northern strongholds and, within a 
year, it would boast a total of 488 local councillors and seven Assembly members (AMs) in the Welsh 
Assembly (including the Tories’ own disgraced ex-minister, Neil Hamilton—see 1.1.1.1). 
By May 2015, then, the die was cast, and all that remained was for the government, under the 
watchful eye of the Electoral Commission (see 4.4.1), to set a date and ground rules for the now-
unavoidable vote. Yet, if anyone naively hoped this might be a smooth and uncontroversial process, 
they were sorely mistaken. From the moment the starter pistol was fired on the (initially informal) 
referendum campaign, deep divisions began to be exposed not only in Tory ranks, but also in 
Labour’s and even UKIP’s—both about the question of Britain’s continued EU membership itself 
and the manner in which campaigning should be conducted. Even after the Commission finally 
decided on two ‘official’ camps—‘Remain’ (fronted by Mr Cameron himself) and ‘Vote Leave’ (led 
by his supposed friends, ex-London Mayor Boris Johnson and then Justice Secretary Michael 
Gove)—the field was cluttered by a torrent of competing, and conflicting, voices. Anxious to avoid a 
repeat of its electorally disastrous decision to share the podium with prominent Tories in the run-up 
to the 2014 Scottish referendum (see 1.3.3), Labour launched a separate ‘In’ campaign of its own, 
chaired by former Cabinet minister Alan Johnson: the clunkily titled ‘Labour In for Britain’. Its 
efforts were somewhat undermined, however, by the decision of fellow former party bigwigs Harriet 
Harman and Ed Balls to break ranks by appearing on the campaign trail alongside Mr Cameron and 
Mr Osborne respectively. To add to the confusion, a handful of Labour Eurosceptics, including 
Vauxhall MP Kate Hoey, unveiled an opposing faction, ‘Labour Leave’—even as her parliamentary 
colleague, Gisela Stewart, was hosting joint press conferences with Messrs Johnson and Gove. 
Meanwhile, the long-term architect of the whole exercise, Mr Farage, had to play second fiddle to 
the official ‘Out’ campaign by launching his own ‘anti-establishment’ effort: ‘Grassroots Out’. 
The bewildering, and ill-disciplined, nature of the rival/opposing alignments was reflected in the 
equally befuddling (and frequently bad-tempered) tone and content of the referendum ‘debate’. With 
‘In’ campaigners warning of dire peril for Britain’s economic stability if it left the EU single market, 
‘Outers’ sloganized about the need to ‘take back control’ of the country’s destiny, while cautioning 
about the risk of its being swamped with migrants should it opt to stay. If truth be told, neither side 
distinguished itself with a very positive vision of the country’s future should their campaign succeed. 
The rest, as they say, is history—at least to the extent that, on 23 June 2016, in a 72 per cent 
turnout, the British electorate voted to leave the Union, by a margin of 51.9 to 42.1 per cent; Mr 
Cameron resigned as prime minister, to be swiftly replaced by Theresa May; and Labour descended 
into a bitter internal feud, sparked by allegations about its leader’s half-hearted contribution to the 
‘In’ cause, that may well resurface in future. But, though the immediate decision has been taken, so 
many questions remain about the precise timing (and nature) of the UK’s departure from the EU that 
the shape of its ongoing relationship with Europe (and the wider world) seems far from certain. 
Indeed, by November the road to departure looked more thorny than ever, thanks to a High Court 
judgment upholding a demand by investment manager Gina Miller, London-based hairdresser Deir 
Dos Santos, and the crowd-funded People’s Challenge group that Parliament must be consulted in a 
formal vote before ministers are authorized to invoke Article 50. The ruling was a constitutional 
milestone, in that it upheld the principle that parliamentary sovereignty, in the end, trumps the 
Executive’s exercise of prerogative powers (see 1.1.1.1). Although ministers’ immediate reaction 
was to set in train an appeal to the UK Supreme Court, at time of writing ‘Remainers’ from all 
parties were urging them to abandon this costly challenge, in light of confirmation that Scotland and 
Wales’s most senior law officers, the Lord Advocate and Counsel General for Wales respectively, 
would be allowed to participate in any such hearing. This raised the prospect of Northern Ireland, 
too, being represented, in addition to an unlikely further party: the Independent Workers’ Union of 
Great Britain, which represents freelance, agency, and low-paid migrant workers, and was formally 
permitted to take part at the same time as Wales and Scotland. At time of writing, ministers were 
preparing a simple, three-line Bill to authorize the Article 50 process if all else failed. Given the 
constitutional quagmire they would otherwise face, this looked the most viable option – particularly 
after a further lawsuit was launched, weeks after the first, by a group of lawyers going under the 
name British Influence. They argued that, by including only a single question on the referendum 
ballot paper, ministers had failed to give voters a say on the UK’s future in the single market itself.  
Assuming all goes to plan, Mrs May aimed to introduce a ‘Great Repeal Bill’ during the 2017-18 
parliamentary session, to formally end the Union’s authority over the UK in one fell swoop on the 
day Brexit finally occurs, by converting all EU provisions into British law. The 1972 European 
Communities Act, which originally paved the way for Britain’s accession, would be repealed at the 
same time. Beyond this, though no one can predict exactly how ‘Brexit’ will turn out in the end, it is 
possible to sketch out some broad alternative scenarios—and it is to these that we now turn. 
9.7.1 Britain joins the European Economic Area (EEA) and retains 
access to the single market 
For all her clarity on entering Downing Street that ‘Brexit means Brexit’, and her stated 
determination to invoke Article 50 by the end of March 2017, Mrs May has since faltered in setting 
out how she will achieve an exit deal that preserves as many of the economic benefits of EU 
membership as possible, while somehow sidestepping the UK’s previous obligations. Central to this 
conundrum is the long-cherished ideal of so-called ‘soft’ Brexiteers that Britain might be allowed to 
opt out of the free movement of peoples (thus curbing inward migration), while retaining full or 
partial access to the ‘single market’: tariff-free reciprocal trade of goods and services between states. 
Opinion is divided, however, about whether this is an option: while Mrs May’s new ‘Brexit 
Secretary’, David Davis, has suggested a ‘generous settlement’ along these lines can be negotiated, 
her Chancellor, Philip Hammond, has repeatedly stated that Britain will be forced out of the single 
market, even if it can subsequently negotiate more or less equitable access to the trading bloc as a 
partner in the European Economic Area (EEA)[AM5][j6]. Established by the European Economic 
Area Agreement in 1992, the EEA is effectively an extension of the single-market region, and 
currently encompasses three countries that are members of the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA), rather than EU: Liechtenstein, Iceland, and Norway. The fourth member of the EFTA, 
Switzerland, has a unique relationship with the EU, enjoying access to the single market while also 
restricting incoming migrants, following a 2014 referendum in which its population rejected free 
movement (though it has repeatedly been told to re-stage this vote, as the result breaches the terms of 
its deal). 
Although forging a relationship along these lines should theoretically be a formality, the sticking-
point (as with Switzerland) is likely to be whether it agrees to the quid pro quo for renewed single-
market access: continued acceptance of EU free movement rules, but without the ability to any 
longer influence those rules, as a non-member. Given that the scale of immigration from fellow 
member states was a decisive factor in the referendum result (net EU migration to Britain was 
184,000 in 2015), this would prove a difficult deal to ‘sell’ to a wary public. Yet Switzerland and 
Norway’s dealings with the EU—for long years held up by Eurosceptics as a model of how Britain 
might forge a rosy European future outside the Union—have been predicated on such arrangements. 
Moreover, 2014 figures produced by independent think tank Open Europe show that net inward EU 
migration to Switzerland has been much higher than that to Britain in recent years (hence that year’s 
referendum). As of 2013, EU citizens accounted for 15.6 per cent of the Swiss population—nearly 
four times as many as the 4.2 per cent of Britain’s populace made up of non-UK EU nationals. 
Moreover, the price of retaining single-market access could be high: contrary to repeated claims by 
‘leave’ campaigners that quitting the EU would save Britons billions of pounds each year, as the UK 
will no longer need to contribute to its budget, EEA states in fact pay substantial annuities to the 
Union. Analysis published by Open Europe in October 2015 showed that Norway makes a net per 
capita contribution to the EU of 107.4 Euros, compared to 139 Euros for each UK citizen. 
9.7.2 Britain leaves both EU and single market and enters new bilateral 
trade partnerships 
Were the prospect of securing ongoing single-market access only in return for continued acceptance 
of largescale EU migration to prove too politically unpalatable for ministers, the other obvious 
alternative would be for Britain to broker what has come to be known as a ‘hard Brexit’ option: i.e. 
forging its own bilateral, or multilateral, trade deals. Given its comparative advantage in some 
specialist hi-tech industries and, especially, financial services, in theory this should be feasible. 
Indeed, within days of his appointment, Mrs May’s International Trade Secretary, Liam Fox, told the 
Sunday Times in July 2016 that he was already ‘scoping out’ up to a dozen potential agreements. 
Among Britain’s most likely prospective partners, given the countries’ long-touted ‘special 
relationship’, would be the USA, while the so-called ‘Osborne Doctrine’ pursued by Mr Hammond’s 
predecessor saw the UK forge ever-closer ties with China—to the dismay of human rights 
campaigners and some in the security lobby. In September 2013, Mr Osborne announced plans to 
make China Britain’s second biggest trading partner (after the US) by 2025, while one of his final 
actions, in July 2016, was to sign a deal ensuring future UK nuclear power plants will be part-funded 
by Chinese investors. Though relations between Britain and Russia remain frosty following the 
latter’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, there is also scope for other deals with individual ‘BRIC’ states 
(the acronym often used for the fast-developing economies of Brazil, Russia, India, and China). 
9.7.3 Britain holds a second referendum-and votes to stay[j7] 
Though the ‘spirit’ of the statute that paved the way for the 2016 referendum, the European 
Referendum Act 2015, suggested it would be legally binding, lawyers and campaigners on either side 
continue to dispute whether the ‘letter’ of the law actually states this—with prominent voices on the 
‘In’ side arguing it should be treated only as ‘advisory’. A handful, including Labour backbencher 
David Lammy, have even suggested that Parliament should simply ignore the will of the people and 
resist pressure to invoke Article 50, in the ‘best interests’ of the country. Others, like fellow 
Opposition MP Mr Smith and former prime ministers Mr Blair and Sir John Major, have steered a 
middle way—arguing it would be legitimate to hold a second referendum, to re-confirm the ‘out’ 
vote, as soon as Britain has sight of a final ‘deal’ outlining what it will gain (and lose) on leaving the 
EU. Mr Farron even pledged that the Lib Dems would campaign on a ‘second referendum’ ticket at 
the 2020 election. If Britons declared they had changed their minds at that time, he argued, so be it. 
9.7.4 Britain leaves the EU (in whatever form)—but Scotland and/or 
Northern Ireland stay 
If, as expected, the UK does withdraw from the EU in due course, a question mark remains over 
whether the slim overall ‘Out’ vote is automatically binding on the two nations that voted to remain: 
Scotland and Northern Ireland. Several Scottish Nationalist Party politicians, including depute 
leadership hopeful Tommy Sheppard, have repeatedly mooted the idea of helping an alliance of pro-
EU MPs block any government attempt to obtain formal backing from the Commons to invoke 
Article 50, if ministers fail to offer ‘special arrangements’ for Scotland. More seriously, perhaps, 
SNP First Minister Nicola Sturgeon has raised the prospect of the Scottish Parliament using its 
devolved powers to veto ‘Brexit’—though it is unlikely that the courts would regard this as 
constitutionally legitimate. More realistic, arguably, is the prospect of a further Scottish 
independence referendum in the event that ministers activate Article 50 without first trying to 
persuade the European Commission to let Scotland remain (as six out of ten Scots voters had hoped). 
Though such a deal might sound far-fetched to some, in fact it has clear precedents: although the 
British protectorate of Gibraltar stands to leave the EU, having been consulted in the referendum, 
several other UK territories (notably Jersey, Guernsey, and the Isle of Man) have never been in the 
Union, while Greenland, part of the state of Denmark, voted to leave the then EEC in 1985, though 
the rest of the country remained. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Northern Ireland’s vote to stay in the EU 
(by 56 to 44 per cent) has also reopened thorny constitutional questions across the Irish Sea. 
Although its First Minister, Democratic Unionist leader Arlene Foster (a ‘leave’ supporter), was 
quick to embrace the UK-wide result, her Sinn Féin deputy, Martin McGuinness, used Brexit as an 
opportunity to renew his party’s call for the reunification of Ireland as a whole, citing concerns that 
Northern Ireland’s departure would otherwise lead to new border controls between the province and 
the Republic of Ireland in the south, undermining tenets of the ‘Good Friday Agreement’ (see 1.3.5). 
 
 
9.8 Other international institutions 
Though the EU is by far the most influential supranational organization of which Britain is (for now) 
a member, it would be remiss to conclude this chapter without briefly mentioning the other 
significant alliances in which it is involved. 
9.8.1 The United Nations (UN) 
The United Nations (UN) is a global body set up after the Second World War with the stated aim of 
promoting peace, preventing future conflicts, and achieving international cooperation on economic, 
social, cultural, and humanitarian issues. Committed to solving disputes between nations by peaceful 
means, when it sends troops into countries this tends to be in a ‘peacekeeping’ capacity—to police 
borders, refugees, or aid routes, rather than engage in active hostilities. 
Formally established in October 1945 and based in New York, the UN set out to avoid the 
perceived errors of its precursor, the League of Nations. The League—born out of the First World 
War—had imposed crippling reparations on Germany, in so doing contributing to the dire economic 
woes that fostered the popularity of Nazism. Initially founded by fifty-one states, today the UN 
embraces 193—with the then newly created state of South Sudan welcomed into its fold in July 
2011. The most senior UN official is its Secretary-General (until 31 December 2016, Ban Ki-Moon), 
and its main governing bodies are the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the UN General Assembly. 
The former is (as its name suggests) in charge of the security/military aspects of the UN’s role. 
Decisions are taken by five permanent members—the UK, France, China, and Russia—and a further 
ten rotating members, elected by the UN’s ‘parliament’, the General Assembly, every other year. As 
a mark of its seniority, each permanent member has the right to veto prospective UN actions. It was 
this fact that presented the biggest stumbling block to the Anglo–American campaign to win support 
for invading Iraq in 2003. Both then French President Jacques Chirac and his Russian counterpart, 
Vladimir Putin, refused to back any further resolution authorizing military strikes without conclusive 
proof that Saddam was stockpiling weapons of mass destruction (WMDs): the ostensible pretext for 
action. The General Assembly’s primary purpose is to approve the UN’s annual budget and drive 
collective policymaking by member states on areas requiring global cooperation, such as 
international aid and climate change. The UN also has a number of agencies, brief outlines of which 
are given in table 9E to be found on the Online Resource Centre. 
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9.8.2 NATO 
Founded in 1949 and based in Brussels, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a 
military alliance, established against the backdrop of the Cold War between East and West. NATO 
comprises twenty-eight members—the United States, Canada, and several western European states—
although since the Soviet Union’s collapse it has also embraced several former Eastern Bloc nations. 
The foundation-stone of NATO was the North Atlantic Treaty, the most oft-cited clause of which 
is Article V, which sets down the principle of ‘collective defence’. Its opening sentence reads: 
<start feature> 
 
‘The Parties of NATO agreed that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North 
America shall be considered an attack against them all.’ 
 
<end feature> 
Article V was invoked in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks on New York, when the US 
government argued that the terrorist strikes on the World Trade Center amounted to a military attack 
on the country and therefore required a joint response from NATO members. There was some 
dispute about whether the usual rules applied, given that precise nationalities of some of the terrorists 
were not immediately known—making any decision to target a specific country in retaliation 
problematic. Having asserted an Al-Qaeda link, the United States argued that the Taliban in 
Afghanistan was principally answerable, since its then leader, the late Mullah Omar, was believed to 
be harbouring Al-Qaeda’s leader, Osama bin Laden. In the event, action in defence of the United 
States was authorized on 4 October 2001 (despite rowdy scenes in some meetings) and the alliance 
participated in two further related operations. Whether the US itself continues to abide by the rules of 
‘collective defence’ in response to threats to its NATO allies over coming years remains to be seen, 
following US President Donald Trump’s recent criticisms of states that failed to pay their ‘fair share’ 
of its budget. NATO’s main governing body is the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and it, too, has a 
Secretary-General (since October 2014, former Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg). 
Operational decisions are taken by senior Armed Forces representatives on its Military Committee. 
9.8.3 The Council of Europe 
Founded in 1949, the Council of Europe pre-dates the EU (with which it and its institutions are 
often confused) by two years. As such, it is the longest-running organization dedicated to promoting 
European integration and cooperation. It has forty-seven member states and aims to foster members’ 
adoption of common legal standards and human rights. To this end its most famous institution is the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg, and its most celebrated (if often 
disputed) achievement the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (see 1.1.1.1). 
9.8.4 The G8 and G20 
The G8—or ‘Group of Eight’—is not a formal body like many others in this list, but rather a forum 
comprising the world’s biggest industrialized nations and military superpowers. Its membership is as 
follows: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK, and the US. Even today, the group 
sometimes convenes in Russia’s absence (as the ‘Group of Seven’ or G7)—and this has happened 
several times during the West’s ongoing dispute with President Putin over his decision to annex the 
Crimea from Ukraine in 2014, following a referendum in the region supporting its return to Russian 
rule. The G7/8’s origins date back to the economic turmoil created in Europe by the 1973 oil 
crisis—pitting the United States, Japan, Britain, and other western European countries against Arab 
nations aligned to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). And, aptly, it 
was another international economic crisis, the 2008–9 banking collapse, that saw it eclipsed in 
influence (and media coverage) by the then newly convened G20 (‘Group of 20’). Though the G20’s 
material achievements have since been patchy, in the aftermath of the ‘crash’ it established an 
international Financial Stability Board (FSB), charged with introducing a raft of measures to guard 
against future crises. Many of its proposals—including a global crackdown on ‘tax havens’ and the 
regulation of hedge funds and private equity firms—have, however, yet to materialize. 
9.8.5 Global financial institutions 
Long pre-dating the FSB, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is tasked with 
maintaining/restoring stability in the global financial sector and preventing widespread recessions, 
using mechanisms like exchange-rate agreements and short-term financial aid. One of its key roles 
since its formation in 1945 has been to loan money to countries experiencing temporary economic 
blips—borrowing funds from a pool contributed to by member states. The IMF today boasts 189 
members, comprising all UN states bar North Korea, Cuba, Andorra, Monaco, and Liechtenstein. 
Based, like the IMF, in Washington DC, The World Bank (or, to use its full title, International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development) was set up on 27 December 1945. Its remit now mainly 
revolves around globally agreed ‘Millennium Development Goals’ to end child poverty and improve 
education and human rights for the poorest nations, yet it has encountered increasing hostility from 
some development charities because of the ‘conditionalities’ it imposes before agreeing to assist 
struggling states. Some see its criteria, typically involving market deregulation and/or privatization 
of state assets, as an attempt to impose a Western-influenced neoliberal economic model on nations 
whose indigenous institutions and sociocultural make-up do not sit easily with it. 
Other noteworthy bodies include the World Trade Organization (WTO), which promotes free and 
fair trade between nations, and the Paris-based Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), which allies a similar focus on global free trade with promoting human rights. 
9.8.6 The Commonwealth of Nations 
The vestiges of the one-time British Empire, today’s residual Commonwealth comprises fifty-three 
countries—most (but not all) former British colonies. Its current membership is outlined in table 9F 
to be found on the Online Resource Centre. 
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<start feature> 
 Topical feature idea 
Britain’s impending departure from the European Union has sparked concerns among EU economic 
migrants already living and working in the UK that they might be asked to leave the country once it 
has formally left. These fears have been stoked by Mrs May’s refusal to confirm their long-term 
status and Brexit Secretary Mr Davis’s suggestion that some could be deported. Mindful that there is 
a large Polish population in your paper’s catchment area, your editor wants you to write a balanced 
backgrounder on this subject. How would you find firm statistics on the numbers of migrants living 
locally, and which sources would you go to for both sides of the migration debate? 
 
<end feature> 
<start feature> 
Current issues 
 Negotiating Brexit With the UK having opted out of the EU, Theresa May’s government 
faces the having to negotiate a deal on its future partnership with the Union (and other states) 
that will give British companies and consumers favourable access to markets without forcing 
the country to accept conditions that undermine its decision to leave (e.g. free movement). 
 Further EU enlargement Negotiations over Turkey’s accession to the EU began seriously in 
2004, but its questionable human rights record, particularly after President Erdogan’s 2016 
crackdown following a failed military coup, have slowed progress. Kosovo is currently 
lobbying for entry and looks set to be accepted before Turkey. 
 Controversy over TTIP The EU and the United States are currently locked in ongoing 
negotiations over the terms of a putative Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP), which would liberalize trade between the two economic blocs. Critics argue that one 
consequence of the deregulation it envisages would be to allow private firms to force 
taxpayer-funded public services, like the NHS, to offer more contracts to commercial firms. 
<end feature> 
<start feature> 
Key points 
1. The European Union (EU) is a community of states initially formed to promote free trade, but 
which has developed cooperative policies on employment rights, asylum and immigration, 
and security and policing. It currently comprises twenty-eight (soon to be twenty-seven) 
members. 
2. Eighteen EU member states share a joint currency: the euro. This is issued by the European 
Central Bank (ECB), based in Frankfurt. 
3. There are four main governing EU institutions, each with a permanent president: the 
European Council; the European Commission; European Parliament; and the Council of the 
European Union (Council of Ministers). The last is the most powerful. 
4. Membership of the Council of Ministers varies, depending on which issue is being debated 
(for example finance ministers attend if it is debating the economy). It votes using a system 
called qualified majority voting (QMV), weighted to give the biggest say to states with the 
largest populations. 
5. Prosecutions under EU law may be brought to the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU), based in Strasbourg. Cases are normally held by its lower court, the General Court. 
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